Tightened estimation can improve the key rate of MDI-QKD by more than
  $100\%$ by Zhou, Y. H. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
59
15
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
0 D
ec
 20
13
Tightened estimation can improve the key rate of MDI-QKD by more than 100%
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We present formulas to tightly upper bound the phase-flip errors in decoy state method by using
4 intensities. Our result compressed the bound to about a quarter of known result for MDI-QKD.
Based on this, we find that the key rate is improved by more than 100% given weak coherent state
sources (WCS), and even more than 200% with the heralded single-photon sources (HSPS).
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fascinating properties of quantum key
distribution (QKD) is its unconditional security in the-
ory [1, 2]. However, most practical devices behave dif-
ferently form the theoretical models assumed in the se-
curity proof. Security for real set-ups of QKD [1, 2] has
become a major problem in this area in the recent years.
The insecurity loopholes are mainly due to the imperfect
single-photon source and the limited efficiency of the de-
tectors. Fortunately, by using the decoy-state method [3–
12], it has been shown that the unconditional security of
QKD can still be assured with an imperfect single-photon
source [13, 14].
Besides the source imperfection, the defect in the de-
tectors is another threaten to the security [15]. To patch
up this, several approaches have been proposed. One is
the device independent QKD (DI-QKD) [16]. This tech-
nique does not require detailed knowledge of how QKD
devices work and can prove security based on the viola-
tion of a Bell inequality.
Recently, an idea of measurement device independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea of en-
tanglement swapping [17, 18]. There, one can make se-
cure QKD simply by virtual entanglement swapping, i.e.,
neither Alice and Bob performs any measurement, but
they only send out quantum signals to the relay which
can be controlled by the un-trusted third party (UTP).
After Alice and Bob send out signals, they wait for UTP’s
announcement of weather he has obtained the successful
detection, and proceed to the standard postprocessing of
their sifted data, such as error rate estimation, error cor-
rection, and privacy amplification. The only assumption
needed in MDI-QKD is that the preparation of the quan-
tum signal sources by Alice and Bob. In practice, in order
to obtain a higher key rate or realize a longer distance
key distribution, we’d better use laser sources with decoy
state method. This has been discussed in Ref. [18], and
explicit formulas for the practical decoy-state implemen-
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tation with only three different states was first presented
in [19], and then further studied both experimentally [20–
22] and theoretically[23–29]. In the previous works, the
authors considered the effect of finite number of decoy
states, but their key rates are notably away form the re-
sult obtained with the infinite decoy-state method. The
major reason is that the upper bounds of the phase-flip
error estimated with these methods are not very tight-
ened.
Here in this work, we show how to tightly formulate
the upper bound of the phase-flip errors in decoy state
method for the regular BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD.
Our result compressed the bound to about a quarter of
known result for MDI-QKD with WCS, and even about
one fifth with HSPS. To achieve the result, we only need
4-intensity decoy state method. Based on this, we find
that the key rate is improved by more than 100% with
WCS, and even more than 200% with HSPS.
II. TRADITIONAL DECOY-STATE METHOD
WITH ONLY 4 INTENSITIES FOR BB84
PROTOCOL
In the four-intensity protocol, Alice has four (virtual)
sources, the vacuum source ρ0 = |0〉〈0| which prepares
vacuum pulses, two decoy sources ρx, ρy which prepare
decoy pulses, and the signal source ρz which prepares
signal pulses. In photon-number space, we suppose
ρl =
∑
k
alk|k〉〈k|, (l = x, y, z), (1)
where |k〉 is the k-photon Fock state, alk ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 0.
At each time, Alice will randomly select one of her 4
sources to emit a pulse. For pose-processing, Alice and
Bob evaluate the data with the same basis. With the
observed total gains and error rates, the final secure key
rate can be calculated by the following formula [3]
R = az1s1[1−H(e1)]− SzH(Ez), (2)
where Sz and Ez denote, respectively, the total gain and
error rate of the signal state ρz . s1 and e1 are, respec-
tively, the fraction and error rate of detection events by
2Bob that have originated form single-photon pulses emit-
ted by Alice, and H is the binary Shannon entropy. In
this paper, we use the capital letter S(E) for known to-
tal gains (error rates) and the lowercase letter s, e for
unknown variables.
In order to estimate the final key rate of this protocol,
we need find out the lower bound of the yield s1 and
the upper bound of the error rate e1. In the coming
subsection, we devote to estimate the lower bound of s1
firstly.
A. The lower bound of the yield s1
With given the different sources, Alice randomly
chooses quantum channels with different photon-number
states. Thus, the total gain with source ρl can be ex-
pressed into the following convex form
Sl =
∑
k≥0
alksk, (l = x, y, z), (3)
where sk is the yield of an k-photon pulse. In order to
obtain an effective lower bound of s1, we need eliminate
the gains associated with the vacuum state from the total
gain firstly. Considering this fact, we can rewrite the
relations in Eq.(3) into
S˜l =
∑
k≥1
alksk, (l = x, y, z), (4)
where we define
S˜l = Sl − a
l
0S0, (l = x, y, z), (5)
with S0 being the gain of the vacuum source.
The lower bound of s1 has already been studied [5–
8]. As presented in the previous works, if Alice has 3
different sources ρo = |0〉〈0|, ρx, ρy, the lower bound of
s1 can be write into
s1(x, y) =
ay2S˜x − a
x
2 S˜y
ax1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2
, (6)
under the condition
ayk
axk
≥
ay2
ax2
≥
ay1
ax1
, (7)
for all k ≥ 2. It is worth pointing out that the lower
bound given by Eq.(6) does not only apply to the weak
coherent source, but also to any source as long as it meets
the condition in Eq.(7).
In this 4-intensity protocol, there are three different
no-vacuum sources. In order to get the lower bound of
s1 directly from Eq.(6), we also need to introduce the
following condition
azk
ayk
≥
az2
ay2
≥
az1
ay1
, (8)
for all k ≥ 2. Then we can obtain some effective lower
bounds of s1 with Eq.(6) by choosing any two different
sources from ρx, ρy and ρz. After this, we can use the
maximum one as the estimation of the lower bound of s1
for this 4-intensity protocol
s′1 = max{s1(x, y), s1(x, z), s1(y, z)}, (9)
where s1(l, r) is just s1(x, y) in Eq.(6) with changing x
and y into l and r respectively. In order to simplify this
expression and derive other main results in this work, we
need to define the following function with sources ρx, ρy
and ρz
G(i, j, k) = (gxi − g
x
j )(g
y
j − g
y
k)− (g
y
i − g
y
j )(g
x
j − g
x
k), (10)
where
glm =
alm
azm
, (m ≥ 1; l = x, y, z). (11)
Now, we assume that the states ρx, ρy and ρz satisfy the
following important condition
G(i, j, k) ≥ 0, (12)
when k − j ≥ j − i ≥ 0. In Appendix A, we will show
that the imperfect sources used in practice such as the
weak coherent sources, the heralded source out of the
parametric-down conversion, satisfy all the above condi-
tions given by Eqs.(7,8,12). With these conditions pre-
sented in Eqs.(7,8,12), we can simplify the lower bound
s′1 by
s′1 = s1(x, y). (13)
The detailed proof of this conclusion can be found in
Appendix B.
B. The upper bound of the error rate e1
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need the
upper bound of the error rate e1. In the previous works,
the upper bound of e1 is obtained by putting the errors
with all muti-photon pulses on the error with the single-
photon pulse. Explicitly, we can write the upper bound
of e1 with 3-intensity decoy state method as follows
e1 =
SxEx − a
x
0S0E0
ax1s1
, (14)
where s1 is the lower bound of s1, Sx and Ex are the total
gain and error rate of the source ρx respectively, S0 and
E0 are the total gain and error rate of the vacuum source
respectively. With the 3-intensity decoy state method,
we can not find out a more better explicit formula to
estimate the upper bound of e1. In order to get a more
tightened upper bound, we need to introduce one more
source. This is the main reason for us to consider the
4-intensity decoy state method.
3Similar to the gain, the error rate can depend on the
photon number. Let us denote ek as the error of an k-
photon pulse. The error rate El for the source ρl(l =
x, y, z) can be given by
Tl = SlEl =
∑
k≥0
alkskek, (l = x, y, z). (15)
If we denote tk = skek, and
T˜l = Tl − a
l
0T0, (l = x, y, z), (16)
Eq.(15) can be rewrite into the following equivalent form
T˜l =
∑
k≥1
alktk, (l = x, y, z). (17)
In this 4-intensity decoy state method, there are 3 dif-
ferent no-vacuum sources can be used for Alice. Then we
have 3 different relations about t1 which are presented in
Eq.(17). With these 3 relations, by eliminating the vari-
ables t2 and t3, we obtain the expression of t1 as follows
t1 = t
′
1 +
∑
k≥4
ft1(k)tk, (18)
where
t
′
1 =
az1a
z
2a
z
3
G(1, 2, 3)
[
(az3a
y
2 − a
y
3a
z
2)T˜x − (a
z
3a
x
2 − a
x
3a
z
2)T˜y + (a
y
3a
x
2 − a
x
3a
y
2)T˜z
]
, (19)
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations: e0 is the error rate of background, ed is the
misalignment-error probability; pd is the dark count rate of
Bob’s per detector; ηv is the detection efficiency of Alice’s
detector; pdv is the dark count rate of Alice’s detector.
e0 ed pd ηv pdv
0.5 1.5% 3.0× 10−6 0.75 1.0 × 10−6
and
ft1(k) = −
G(2, 3, k)
G(1, 2, 3)
, (k ≥ 4), (20)
with G(1, 2, 3) being defined in Eq.(10). Under the con-
dition presented in Eq.(12), we can easily find out that
ft1(k) ≤ 0 for all k ≥ 4. Then we can conclude that t
′
1
given by Eq.(19) is actually a upper bound of t1. Then
the upper bound of e1 can be given by
e′1 =
t
′
1
s′1
(21)
where s′1 is the lower bound of s1 given by Eq.(13).
C. Numerical Simulation for BB84 protocol
In this subsection, we will present some numerical sim-
ulations to compare the results obtained by using the
3-intensity decoy state method with the results of 4-
intensity method for the regular BB84 protocol. As
discussed before, we know that the methods presented
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The ratio of the upper bound of e1
between the estimations obtained by using 4-intensity and
3-intensity decoy state methods, i.e., e′1/e1, versus the total
channel transmission loss. We set µ1 = 0.2 for decoy state.
in this work does not only apply to the weak coherent
sources (WCS). Actually, it can be used to estimate the
final key rate for any sources that satisfy the condition
given by Eq.(7) for the 3-intensity method, and the con-
ditions given by Eqs.(7,8,12) for the 4-intensity method.
Below for simplicity, we consider the following two cases.
In the first case, we suppose that Alice use WCS. In
the second one, we suppose she use the heralded single-
photon sources (HSPS) with possion distributions [23].
The Bob’s detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same
dark count rate and detection efficiency, and the detec-
tion efficiency does not depend on the incoming states.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The relative value between the optimal
key rate obtained with different methods and the asymptotic
limit of the infinite decoy-state method versus the total chan-
nel transmission loss. We set µ1 = 0.2 for decoy states.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The ratio of the optimal key rate be-
tween the estimations obtained by using 4-intensity and 3-
intensity decoy state methods versus the total channel trans-
mission loss. We set µ1 = 0.2 for decoy state.
Suppose the overall transmission probability of each pho-
ton is ξ. In a normal channel, it is common to assume
independence between the behaviors of the n photons.
Therefore, the transmission efficiency for n-photon pulses
ξn is given by
ξn = 1− (1− ξ)
n.
For fair comparison, we use the same parameter values
used in [30] for our numerical evaluation. For simplicity,
we shall put the detection efficiency to the overall trans-
mittance η = ξζ. We assume all detectors of Bob have
the same detection efficiency ζ and dark count rate pd.
In the second case with HSPS, we assume the detector
of Alice has the detection efficiency ηv and dark count
rate pdv. The values of these parameters are presented
in Table I. With this, the total gains Sµi and error rates
SµiEµi of Alice’s intensity µi (i = 0, 1, 2 for 3-intensity
method, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 for 4-intensity method) can be cal-
culated. By using these values, we can estimate the lower
bounds of yield s1 with Eq.(6) and Eq.(13) for 3-intensity
and 4-intensity decoy state methods respectively. Also,
we can estimate the upper bounds of error rate e1 with
Eq.(14) and Eq.(21) for 3-intensity and 4-intensity de-
coy sate methods respectively. Furthermore, with these
parameters, we can estimate the final key rate R of this
protocol with Eq.(2). If we fix the density(ies) of the
decoy-state source(s) used by Alice, the final key rate
will change with Alice taking different intensities for hers
signal-state pulses. Here, in order to make a rational and
effective comparison, we set the intensities of the decoy
source in 3-intensity method and the first decoy source in
4-intensity method are the same and µ1 = 0.2; let the in-
tensity of the second decoy source in 4-intensity method
to be the optimal intensity of signal source in 3-intensity
method and assume µ2 > µ1.
With these preparations, we can conclude that the
lower bounds of s1 estimated by using the 3-intensity
and 4-intensity decoy state methods are the same, i.e.,
s1 = s
′
1. In order to see more clearly, in Fig.1, we plot
the ratio of the upper bound of e1 between the estima-
tions obtained by using 4-intensity and 3-intensity decoy
state methods, i.e., e′1/e1. The relative value between
the optimal key rate obtained with different methods and
the asymptotic limit of the infinite decoy-state method
are shown in Fig.2. In order to clarify the superiority
of the 4-intensity decoy state method, we plot the ratio
of the optimal key rate between the results obtained by
using 4-intensity and 3-intensity decoy state methods in
Fig.3. In Fig.1 and Fig.3, the blue dashed lines are ob-
tained with WCS, the red solid lines are obtained with
HSPS. In Fig.2, the black dotted line and green dash-dot
line are the results obtained by using 3-intensity decoy
state method with WCS and HSPS respectively, the blue
dashed line and the red solid line are the results obtained
by using 4-intensity decoy state with WCS and HSPS re-
spectively. With these 3 figures, we can conclude that
the results obtained by using the 4-intensity decoy state
method are better than the results of 3-intensity method.
But it only have a litter improvement.
III. TIGHTENED FORMULA FOR
DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD WITH 4 INTENSITIES
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse
state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is
controlled by an UTP. The UTP will announce whether
the pulse-pair has caused a successful event. Those bits
corresponding to successful events will be post-selected
and further processed for the final key. Since real set-
ups only use imperfect single-photon sources, we need
the decoy-state method for security.
5We assume Alice (Bob) has four sources, oA, xA, yA, zA
(oB , xB, yB, zB) which can only emit four different states
ρrA(ρrB ),(r = o, x, y, z). In the following discussion, we
assume oA and oB are two vacuum sources. In photon
number space, we have ρoA = |0〉〈0|, ρoB = |0〉〈0|. For
the others, suppose
ρrA =
∑
k
ark|k〉〈k|, ρrB =
∑
k
brk|k〉〈k|, (r = x, y, z).
In order to obtain the main results, we also need to in-
troduce the following function
H(i, j, k) = (hxi −h
x
j )(h
y
j −h
y
k)−(h
y
i −h
y
j )(h
x
j −h
x
k), (22)
where
hln =
bln
bzn
, (n ≥ 1, l = x, y, z). (23)
Now, we assume that the states ρxA(B) , ρyA(B) and ρzA(B)
satisfy the following important conditions:
czk
cyk
≥
cz2
cy2
≥
cz1
cy1
,
cyk
cxk
≥
cy2
cx2
≥
cy1
cx1
, (c = a, b), (24)
for k ≥ 2, and
G(i, j, k) ≥ 0, H(i, j, k) ≥ 0, (25)
when k−j ≥ j−i ≥ 0. Similar to G, the imperfect sources
used in practice such as the coherent state source, the
heralded source out of the parametric-down conversion,
satisfy the above restrictions. Given a specific type of
source, the above listed different states have different av-
eraged photon numbers (intensities), therefore the states
can be obtained by controlling the light intensities.
At each time, Alice will randomly select one of her 3
sources to emit a pulse, and so does Bob. The pulse
from Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and
are sent to the un-trusted relay. We regard equivalently
that each time a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse
pair (one pulse from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emit-
ted. For post-processing, Alice and Bob evaluate the data
sent in two bases separately. The Z-basis is used for key
generation, while the X-basis is used for testing against
tampering and the purpose of quantifying the amount of
privacy amplification needed. With the observed total
gains and error rates, we can calculate the final secure
key rate with the following formula [18]
R = az1b
z
1s
Z
11[1−H(e
X
11)]− S
Z
zAzB
fH(EZzAzB ), (26)
where SZzAzB and E
Z
zAzB
denote, respectively, the gain
and error rate in the Z-basis when both Alice and Bob
use z-source ρzA and ρzB ; f is the efficiency factor of
the error correction method used; sZ11 and e
X
11 are the
gain and error rate when both Alice and Bob send single-
photon states. In this paper, we use capital letter Z(X)
for the bases and the lowercase letter x, y, z for the dif-
ferent sources.
In order to estimate the final key rate of this protocol,
we need find out the lower bound of the yield s11 and the
upper bound of the error rate e11.
A. The lower bound of the yield s11
With given the different sources, Alice and Bob ran-
domly choose quantum channels with different photon-
number states. Thus, the total gain can be expressed
into the following convex form
Slr =
∑
j,k≥0
aljb
r
ksjk, (l, r = x, y, z), (27)
when Alice and Bob send pulses with ρlA and ρrB re-
spectively. Here and after, we omit the subscripts A
and B without causing any ambiguity. It is well-known
that, in order to obtain an effective lower bound of s11,
we need eliminate the gains associated with the vacuum
state from the total gain firstly. Considering this fact, we
can rewrite the relation in Eq.(27) into
S˜lr =
∑
j,k≥1
aljb
r
ksjk, (l, r = x, y, z), (28)
with
S˜lr = Slr−a
l
0S0r−b
r
0Sl0+a
l
0b
r
0S00, (l, r = x, y, z). (29)
The lower bound of s11 has already been exhaus-
tive studied for 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD pro-
tocol [19, 23, 26–28]. Until now, the most tightly explicit
formula to calculate the lower bound of s11 is given in
Ref.[26]. As presented in Ref.[26], the lower bound of s11
with 3 different sources (oA, lA, rA and oB, lB, rB) used
in each side of Alice and Bob can be expressed as
s11(l, r) =
(al1a
r
2b
l
1b
r
2 − a
r
1a
l
2b
r
1b
l
2)S˜ll − b
l
1b
l
2(a
l
1a
r
2 − a
r
1a
l
2)S˜lr − a
l
1a
l
2(b
l
1b
r
2 − b
r
1b
l
2)S˜rl
al1b
l
1(a
l
1a
r
2 − a
r
1a
l
2)(b
l
1b
r
2 − b
r
1b
l
2)
, (30)
6under the condition
ark
alk
≥
ar2
al2
≥
ar1
al1
,
brk
blk
≥
br2
bl2
≥
br1
bl1
,
for all k ≥ 2, where S˜ll, S˜lr, S˜rl are the amended gains
defined by Eq.(28). In this 4-intensity protocol, there
are 3 no-vacuum sources. We can estimate the effective
lower bounds of s11 with Eq.(30) by choosing l and r
as any two different sources from x, y, z. Then we can
use the maximum one as the lower bound of s11 for this
4-intensity protocol
s′11 = max{s11(x, y), s11(x, z), s11(y, z)}. (31)
Actually, under the assumptions given by Eqs.(24-25),
we can simplify the lower bound of s11 in Eq.(31) by
choosing the lowest two sources at each sides of Alice
and Bob, such that
s′11 = s11(x, y). (32)
The detailed proof of this conclusion can be found in
appendix B.
B. The upper bound of the error rate e11
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need
the upper bound of the error rate e11. In previous works,
the upper bound of e11 is obtained by putting the errors
with all multi-photon pairs on the error with the single-
photon pair. Explicitly, we can write the upper bound of
e11 with 3-intensity decoy state method as follows
e11 =
SxxExx − a
x
0S0xE0x − b
x
0Sx0Ex0 + a
x
0b
x
0S00E00
ax1b
x
1s11
,
(33)
where s11 is the lower bound of s11, Slr and Elr are
the total gain and error rate when Alice use the source
ρlA and Bob use the source ρrB respectively. With the
numerical results presented in the third subsection of this
part, we know that the upper bound obtained with this
method is too rough to get an tight estimation of the
final key rate comparing with the results obtained by
using the infinite-decoy sate method. In order to find out
a more tightened upper bound of e11, we need introduce
one more source in each side of Alice and Bob. This is the
main reason for us to consider the 4-intensity decoy state
method for MDI-QKD. As expected, we can find out a
more tightened upper bound of e11 for this protocol.
Similar to the total gain, the error rate can be write
into the following convex expressions
T˜lr =
∑
j,k≥1
aljb
r
ktjk, (l, r = x, y, z), (34)
where Tlr = ElrSlr, tjk = sjkejk, and
T˜lr = Tlr−a
l
0T0r−b
r
0Tl0+a
l
0b
r
0T00, (l, r = x, y, z). (35)
In this 4-intensity protocol, there are 3 different no-
vacuum sources in each side of Alice and Bob. Then we
have 9 different relations about e11 which are given by
Eq.(34). With these 9 relations, by eliminating the vari-
ables t12, t21, t22, t13, t23, t33, t32, t31, we obtain the ex-
pression of t11
t11 = t
′
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
ft11(m,n)tmn, (36)
where J0 = {(m,n)|m,n ≥ 1;m + n ≥ 5; (m,n) 6=
(2, 3); (m,n) 6= (3, 3); (m,n) 6= (3, 2)},
t
′
11 =
(ay2a
z
3 − a
z
2a
y
3)T
x
b − (a
x
2a
z
3 − a
z
2a
x
3)T
y
b + (a
x
2a
y
3 − a
y
2a
x
3)T
z
b
az1a
z
2a
z
3G(1, 2, 3)b
z
1b
z
2b
z
3H(1, 2, 3)
, (37)
and
ft11(m,n) = −
azmG
′(m)bznH
′(n)
az1G(1, 2, 3)b
z
1H(1, 2, 3)
, (38)
with
T lb = (h
y
2 − h
y
3)T˜lx − (h
x
2 − h
x
3)T˜ly + (h
y
3h
x
2 − h
x
3h
y
2)T˜lz,
for l = x, y, z, and
G′(m) =


G(m, 2, 3), m = 1, 2;
G(2, 3,m), m ≥ 3,
H′(n) =


H(n, 2, 3), n = 1, 2;
H(2, 3, n), n ≥ 3.
Here, hlk is defined by Eq.(23), G(i, j, k) and H(i, j, k) are
defined in Eq.(10) and Eq.(22) respectively. With the
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The estimated values of e11 versus the
total channel transmission loss for MDI-QKD with WCS and
HSPS. We set µ1 = ν1 = 0.1 for decoy state, and µ2 = ν2.
TABLE II: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations: e0 is the error rate of background, ed is the
misalignment-error probability; pd is the dark count rate of
UTP’s per detector; f is the error correction inefficiency; ηv
is the detection efficiency of Alice and Bob’s detector; pdv is
the dark count rate of Alice and Bob’s detector.
e0 ed pd f ηv pdv
0.5 1.5% 3.0× 10−6 1.16 0.75 1.0 × 10−6
conditions presented in Eqs.(24-25), we can prove that
ft11(m,n) ≤ 0, (39)
for all (m,n) ∈ J0. Then we conclude that the expres-
sion given by Eq.(37) is actually an upper bound of t11.
With this, we can estimate the upper bound of e11 by
the following explicit formula
e′11 =
t
′
11
s′11
, (40)
where s′11 is the lower bound of s11 given in Eq.(32).
C. Numerical Simulation for MDI-QKD
In this section, we will present some numerical sim-
ulations to comparing our results with the results ob-
tained by using 3-intensity decoy state method for MDI-
QKD [26]. As discussed before, we know that the meth-
ods presented in this paper does not only apply to the
weak coherent sources (WCS). Actually, it can be used to
estimate the final key rate for any sources that satisfy the
condition given by Eqs.(24-25). Below for simplicity, we
consider the following two cases. In the first case, we sup-
pose that Alice and Bob use the WCS. In the second one,
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The optimal key rate versus the total
channel transmission loss using different methods for MDI-
QKD with WCS and HSPS. We set µ1 = ν1 = 0.1 for decoy
states, and µ2 = ν2.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The relative optimal key rate of dif-
ferent methods versus the total channel transmission loss for
MDI-QKD with WCS and HSPS. We set µ1 = ν1 = 0.1 for
decoy states, and µ2 = ν2.
we suppose they use the heralded single-photon sources
(HSPS) with possion distributions [23]. The UTP locates
in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP’s detectors
are identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rate and
detection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does
not depend on the incoming signals. We shall estimate
what values would be probably observed for the gains
and error rates in the normal cases by the linear models
as in [5, 18, 29]:
|n〉〈n| =
n∑
k=0
Cknξ
k(1− ξ)n−k|k〉〈k|
where ξk is the transmittance for a distance from Al-
ice to the UTP. For fair comparison, we use the same
810 20 30 40 50 60 70
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total transmission loss (dB)
Th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f o
pt
im
al
 k
ey
 ra
te
 
 
WCS
HSPS
FIG. 7: (Color online) The ratio of the optimal key rates
between the estimations obtained by using 4-intensity and 3-
intensity decoy state methods versus the total channel trans-
mission loss for MDI-QKD with WCS and HSPS. We set
µ1 = ν1 = 0.1 decoy states, and µ2 = ν2.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The optimal intensity of the signal
states versus the total channel transmission loss using 3-
intensity and 4-intensity decoy state methods for MDI-QKD
with WCS and HSPS. We set µ1 = ν1 = 0.1 for decoy states,
and µ2 = ν2.
parameter values used in [18] for our numerical evalua-
tion, which follow the experiment reported in [30]. For
simplicity, we shall put the detection efficiency to the
overall transmittance η = ξ2ζ. We assume all detectors
of UTP have the same detection efficiency ζ and dark
count rate pd. In the second case with HPSP, we as-
sume all detectors of Alice and Bob have the same detec-
tion efficiency ηv and dark count rate pdv. The values of
these parameters are presented in Table II. With this, by
taking the photon-number-cutoff approximation up to 6
photon-number state, the total gains Sωµi,νj , (ω = X,Z)
and error rates Sωµi,νjE
ω
µi,νj
, (ω = X,Z) of Alice’s inten-
sity µi (i = 0, 1, 2 for 3-intensity method, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 for
4-intensity method) and Bob’s intensity νj (j = 0, 1, 2 for
3-intensity method, j = 0, 1, 2, 3 for 4-intensity method)
can be calculated. By using these values, we can estimate
the lower bounds of yield sZ11 with Eq.(30) and Eq.(32)
for 3-intensity and 4-intensity decoy state methods re-
spectively. Also, we can estimate the upper bounds of
error rate eX11 with Eq.(33) and Eq.(40) for these two de-
coy state methods respectively. Furthermore, with these
parameters, we can estimate the final key rate R of this
protocol with Eq.(26). If we fix the densities of the decoy-
state sources used by Alice and Bob, the final key rate
will change with they taking different intensities for their
signal-state pulses. Here, in order to make a rational and
effective comparison, we set the intensities of the decoy
source in 3-intensity method and the first decoy source
in 4-intensity method are the same and µ1 = ν1 = 0.1;
let the intensity of the second decoy source in 4-intensity
method to be the optimal intensity of signal source in
3-intensity method and assume µ2 = ν2 > µ1 [31].
With these preparations, we can conclude that the
lower bounds of s11 estimated by using the 3-intensity
and 4-intensity decoy state methods are the same, i.e.,
s11 = s
′
11. In Fig.4, we plot the upper bound of e11
with different methods. The optimal key rates with dif-
ferent methods for WCS and HSPS are shown in the up
and down subfigures respectively in Fig.5. To see more
clearly, in Fig.6, we plot the relative value between the
optimal key rate obtained with different methods and
the asymptotic limit of the infinite decoy-state method.
In order to clarify the superiority of the 4-intensity de-
coy state method, we plot the ratio of the optimal key
rate between the results obtained by using 4-intensity
and 3-intensity decoy state methods in Fig.7. These fig-
ures clearly show that our results are better than the
pre-existed results. The optimal densities with the opti-
mal key rate versus the total channel transmission loss is
given in Fig.8. In Fig.4 and Fig.6, the black dotted line
and green dash-dot line are the results obtained by using
3-intensity decoy state method with WCS and HSPS re-
spectively, the blue dashed line and the red solid line are
the results obtained by using 4-intensity decoy state with
WCS and HSPS respectively, the thick cyan line are the
results obtained by using infinite decoy state method. In
Fig.5 and Fig.8, the green dotted, the red dashed and
the cyan solid lines are the results obtained by using 3-
intensity, 4-intensity and the infinite decoy state methods
respectively. In Fig.7, the blue dashed lines are obtained
with WCS, the red solid lines are obtained with HSPS.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARK
In conclusion, we show how to tightly formulate the up-
per bound of the phase-flip errors in decoy state method
for the regular BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD. Our result
compressed the bound to about a quarter of known result
for MDI-QKD with WCS, and even about one fifth with
9HSPS. To achieve the result, we only need 4-intensity de-
coy state method. These methods can be applied to the
recently proposed protocols with imperfect single-photon
source such as the coherent states or the heralded states
from the parametric down conversion. Based on this, we
find that the key rate is improved by more than 100%
with WCS, and even more than 200% with HSPS.
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Appendix A. Eqs.(7,8,12,24,25) with the
imperfect sources used in practice
We know that the state emits from a parametric down-
conversion (PDC) source is [17,18]
ρl =
∑
k
alk|k〉〈k|,
with alk = e
−llk/k! or alk = l
k/(l+ 1)k+1 where |k〉 repre-
sents an k-photon state, l is the intensity (average photon
number) of ρl. Firstly, in this appendix, we will prove
that the assumptions given by Eqs.(7,8,12) are satisfied
by the PDC source. In the 4-intensity protocol, Alice
has 3 different no-vacuum sources which are denoted by
ρx, ρy, ρz with 0 < x < y < z.
In the case with alk = e
−llk/k!, we have
ayk
axk
= ex−y
yk
xk
,
azk
ayk
= ey−z
zk
yk
, (k ≥ 0).
Then we can easily prove the conclusions in Eqs.(7,8)
with x < y < z. In order to prove the result presented in
Eq.(12), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any two natural number m,n with m >
n ≥ 1, F(v) = 1−v
m
1−vn is a monotone increasing function
in the domain v ∈ (0, 1).
The function F(v) = 1−v
m
1−vn can be rewritten into
F(v) =
∑m−1
k=0 v
k∑n−1
k=0 v
k
= 1 + vn
∑m−n−1
k=0 v
k∑n−1
k=0 v
k
= 1 +
∑m−n−1
k=0 v
k∑n
k=1 1/v
k
.
This predicts that the function F(v) is monotone increas-
ing with m > n ≥ 1 in the domain v ∈ (0, 1).
With the definition of G(i, j, k) in Eq.(10), we have
ex+y−2zG(i, j, k)
= [xir − x
j
r][y
j
r − y
k
r ]− [y
i
r − y
j
r][x
j
r − x
k
r ]
= xiry
j
r[1− x
j−i
r ][1− y
k−j
r ]− y
i
rx
j
r[1− y
j−i
r ][1− x
k−j
r ],
with xr = x/z and yr = y/z. If x < y < z, and k − j ≥
j − i ≥ 0, we get
xiry
j
r
yirx
j
r
=
xi
zi
yj
zj
·
zi
yi
zj
xj
=
(y
x
)j−i
≥ 1,
and
(1− xj−ir )(1 − y
k−j
r )− (1− y
j−i
r )(1 − x
k−j
r )
= (1− xj−ir )(1 − y
j−i
r )
(
1− yk−jr
1− yj−ir
−
1− xk−jr
1− xj−ir
)
≥ 0.
In the last step, we have used Lemma 1. With these
relations, we can finish the proof of Eq.(12).
In the case with alk = l
k/(l + 1)k+1, we have
ayk
axk
=
x+ 1
y + 1
(
xy + y
xy + x
)k
,
azk
ayk
=
y + 1
z + 1
(
yz + z
yz + y
)k
,
for all k ≥ 1. Then we can easily prove the conclusions
in Eqs.(7,8) with x < y < z. By introducing
x˜r =
xz + x
xz + z
, y˜r =
yz + y
yz + z
,
we find out
(1 + x)(1 + y)
(1 + z)2
G(i, j, k)
= [x˜ir − x˜
j
r][y˜
j
r − y˜
k
r ]− [y˜
i
r − y˜
j
r][x˜
j
r − x˜
k
r ]
= x˜ir y˜
j
r [1− x˜
j−i
r ][1− y˜
k−j
r ]− y˜
i
rx˜
j
r [1− y˜
j−i
r ][1− x˜
k−j
r ].
If x < y < z, with Lemma 1, we can prove that
G(i, j, k) ≥ 0 when k − j ≥ j − i ≥ 0. This complete
the proof of Eq.(12).
Similarly, we can prove that those assumptions in
Eqs.(7,8,12) can be fulfilled by the heralded single-
photon sources (HSPS) with possion or thermal distri-
butions [23]. When we consider the 4-intensity decoy
state method for MDI-QKD, the assumptions presented
in Eqs.(24-25) can be fulfilled if Alice and Bob choose
PDC sources or HSPS.
Appendix B. The derivation of the simplified
forms of s′1 and s
′
11
As discussed in section II, the lower bound of s1 can
be estimated by Eq.(6) when Alice use three different
sources ρo, ρx and ρy. Furthermore, in this case, we can
write s1 into the following form with s1(x, y)
s1 = s1(x, y) +
∑
m≥3
f (x,y)s1 (m)sm,
where
f (x,y)s1 (m) =
ax2a
y
m − a
y
2a
x
m
ax1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2
, (m ≥ 3).
Similarly, if Alice choose sources ρo, ρx, ρz and ρo, ρy, ρz,
then s1 can also be expressed into
s1 = s1(x, z) +
∑
m≥3
f (x,z)s1 (m)sm,
s1 = s1(y, z) +
∑
m≥3
f (y,z)s1 (m)sm,
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with
f (x,z)s1 (m) =
ax2a
z
m − a
z
2a
x
m
ax1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2
, f (y,z)s1 (m) =
ay2a
z
m − a
z
2a
y
m
ay1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
y
2
,
respectively. By calculation, we have
f (x,y)s1 (m)− f
(x,z)
s1
(m) = −
ax2a
z
1a
z
2a
z
3G(1, 2,m)
(ax1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2)(a
x
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)
,
f (x,z)s1 (m)− f
(y,z)
s1
(m) = −
az2a
z
1a
z
2a
z
3G(1, 2,m)
(ax1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)(a
y
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
y
2)
.
According to the conditions given by Eqs.(7,8,12), we can
easily prove that
f (x,y)s1 (m) ≤ f
(x,z)
s1
(m) ≤ f (y,z)s1 (m),
for all m ≥ 3. So we have
s1(x, y) ≥ s1(x, z) ≥ s1(y, z).
This completes the proof of Eq.(13).
Now we commit to prove Eq.(32) for MDI-QKD.
By choosing any two different no-vacuum sources
ρlA(B) , ρrA(B) form ρxA(B) , ρyA(B) , ρzA(B) , we have
s11 = s11(l, r) +
∑
(m,n)∈J1
f (l,r)s11 (m,n)smn,
with s11(l, r) being defined in Eq.(30) by replacing x, y
with l, r respectively, and
f (l,r)s11 (m,n) =
al2b
l
n(a
l
1a
r
m − a
r
1a
l
m)(b
l
1b
r
2 − b
r
1b
l
2) + a
l
mb
l
1(a
l
1a
r
2 − a
r
1a
l
2)(b
l
2b
r
n − b
r
2b
l
n)
al1b
l
1(a
l
1a
r
2 − a
r
1a
l
2)(b
l
1b
r
2 − b
r
1b
l
2)
.
where (l, r) ∈ {(x, y), (x, z), (y, z)}, J1 = {(m,n)|m,n ≥
1;m + n ≥ 4}. In the coming, we will compare the
relations among f
(x,y)
s11 (m,n), f
(x,y)
s11 (m,n), f
(x,y)
s11 (m,n).
Firstly, we have
f (x,y)s11 (1, n)− f
(x,z)
s11
(1, n) =
−bx2b
z
1b
z
2b
z
nH(1, 2, n)
(bx1b
y
2 − b
y
1b
x
2)(b
x
1b
z
2 − b
z
1b
x
2)
,
f (x,z)s11 (1, n)− f
(y,z)
s11
(1, n) =
−bz1b
z
2b
z
2b
z
nH(1, 2, n)
(bx1b
y
2 − b
y
1b
x
2)(b
x
1b
z
2 − b
z
1b
x
2)
,
for all n ≥ 3. Secondly, we obtain
f (x,y)s11 (n, 1)− f
(x,z)
s11
(n, 1) =
−ax2a
z
1a
z
2a
z
nG(1, 2, n)
(ax1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2)(a
x
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)
,
f (x,z)s11 (n, 1)− f
(y,z)
s11
(n, 1) =
−az1a
z
2a
z
2a
z
nG(1, 2, n)
(ax1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2)(a
x
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)
,
for all n ≥ 3. In the last case, we get
f (x,y)s11 (m,n)− f
(x,z)
s11
(m,n) = −
ax2b
x
na
z
1a
z
2a
z
mG(1, 2,m)
bx1(a
x
1a
y
2 − a
y
1a
x
2)(a
x
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)
−
bx2a
x
mb
z
1b
z
2b
z
nH(1, 2, n)
ax1(b
x
1b
y
2 − b
y
1b
x
2)(b
x
1b
z
2 − b
z
1b
x
2)
,
and
f (x,z)s11 (m,n)− f
(y,z)
s11
(m,n) ≤ −
ay2b
y
na
z
1a
z
2a
z
1a
z
mG(1, 2,m)
ay1b
y
1(a
x
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
x
2)(a
y
1a
z
2 − a
z
1a
y
2)
−
aymb
z
1b
z
2b
z
2b
z
nH(1, 2, n)
ay1(b
x
1b
z
2 − b
z
1b
x
2)(b
y
1b
z
2 − b
z
1b
y
2)
,
for all m,n ≥ 2. In the lase inequality, we have used the
assumption presented in Eq.(24). With these relations,
we can conclude that
f (x,y)s11 (m,n) ≤ f
(x,z)
s11
(m,n) ≤ f (y,z)s11 (m,n),
for any (m,n) ∈ J1 under the conditions in Eqs.(24-25).
This completes the proof of Eq.(32).
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